Human security as a tool for counter-insurgency in  South East Nigeria

Introduction

Insurgency is a sign of a failing state in a country that is not productive in promoting the human security index. Various strategies and practices of counterinsurgency have been applied by different countries of the world with the intended action of halting insurgency in the face of a dynamic global political virus mostly erected in developing countries as a result of weak institutional fragility. Nigeria one of the countries in Africa is battered with a series of insurgency and banditry challenges which is an obstacle to the development of the polity.  Nigeria has been besieged by the dangerous activities of insurgents, armed bandits, and violent non-state actors. In what reflects a free-for-all, the entire country seems to be enmeshed in a theatre of violence, with an intensity that is unprecedented since Nigeria’s return to civil rule in 1999 [1]. The weak institutional fragility and lack of political will on the part of the government have resulted in increased proliferation of arms in the hands of insurgents and bandits in Nigeria [2].  The nexus between banditry and insurgency is positively related even when there are a series of political analyses given the distinctive difference between the two concepts. The clear analysis of [3] gives a thought of symmetrical relationship between the two concepts.

The insurgency paves the way for insecurity in Nigeria which is a phenomenon that arrests the well-being of Nigerians and has resulted in the proliferation of crime [4]. The South-west is attracted to cybercrime, armed robbery, domestic crime, kidnapping, ritual killings, and herder-farmer conflicts.  South East is plagued by secessionist campaigns and agitation, ritual killings, kidnapping, commercial crime, and attacks by unknown gunmen and banditry, while the South-South remains home to militancy, environmental agitation, and kidnapping. In the Northern East bad behaviour of Boko Haram insurgency, North Central witnessed a series of herderfarmers conflicts, armed robbery, and banditry, and the North West was greeted with illegal mining, ethno-religious crisis, and banditry [4]. Insecurity proliferation is increasing functionalism development and political instability, which has claimed a lot of lives and properties.

The Boko Haram insurgency in the northeast part of Nigeria is a challenge to the national development of the country. Insurgency phenomenon in any given country of the world is systemic in mechanism, that is the unrest or insecurity of one part or region affects the whole state [5]. This is a situation that insurgency in the northeast and another part has caused Nigeria state. The rise of Boko Haram increased its ability to exert control and power over the northeast region in its steadfast attempts toward the Islamization of Nigeria [6]. The operation mechanism of Boko Haram is a challenge to the human security of the whole country which results in the loss of lives and property, unemployment, and the displacement of people in affected communities in this region [7]. The inflow of some settler Nigerians in this part to other regions for security and livelihood retarded state economic and national development.

The uprising of insurgency in the southeast of Nigeria is becoming food for thought welcoming a series of debates, which is more controversial to approach. The insurgency phenomenon generated analysis from the unclear intention of ‘Biafra’ a story that can be traced back to 1967-1970 [8].  The increase in the numeric strength of the insurgency was interpreted by some Nigerians as a means of agitating for an independent state. From the left ideology of some personalities in the eastern part of Nigeria, this reaction was born from frustration and marginalization of the southeast from the political hegemony of leadership; which the Igbos believe is their turn for the presidency [9]. The contextual analysis of George Obiozor, the president of Ohanaeze claims the southeast is demanding the President, not the Igbo head of state [10]. This shows the length of marginalization of the eastern part of the country by the denial to the political leadership of being a president. This can be viewed as Nigeria serving from one pot with different spoons. The eminent leader of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB ), Nnamdi Kanu under government detention for the second time from 27 June 2021 to 2024 led to the insurgency of a sit-down at home which started on 18 and 26 May 2022 in the southeast of Nigeria till date.

The matter that arises between Nnamdi Kanu and the Federal government of Nigeria is another political scene in the politics of Nigeria. The  United Nations and Nigerian courts ordered the release of Nnamdi Kanu in July, October, and November 2022 respectively, of which the Federal government refuted the proclamation by the  court of the land. This is view by some people as  injustice and limitation of the judiciary power in Nigeria. This paper has the foresight that good governance that ensures human security will serve as a tool for counter-insurgency under the moral and ethical conditions in the southeast. The paper emphasises human security as an answer to combat insurgency in Nigeria, as the paper examines Human security as a tool for counter-insurgency in South East Nigeria.

 1.1 Theoretical Framework

The theories that will be employed in this paper is situational action  theory. The situational action theory gains its foundation from social banditry or social crime theory invented in the work of  Eric Hobsbawm  a great Marxist historian in a 1959 book titled Primitive Rebels and the 1969 book Bandits. Situational Action Theory was developed by Wikstromm Per Olof in 2004 [11]. It is a situational based theory, that explains what moves people to act like a crime which is attracted by ecological, criminological, sociological, and behavioral sciences.  The theory asserted that crime is motivated by individual morality and the prevailing situation. People committed crme to express their frustration in given stuation. In many developing countries youth unemployment or lack of empowerment programme result in criminal activities such as stealing,robbing, kidnnapping, and banditry. The situation that pave way for the crime is the unemployment situations in some developing countries which are the responsibilities of the government, private organisation bodies, philanthropic groups in  society, and social responsibility of rich individual in a state. The youth crime action may be wrong, but the situations that lead to the actions are failure of the government and some private components bodies in the state, which may sometimes justified reasons for the crime. But, the reasons or situations surrounding the crime are not judge but the action (the crime). This is to say people are responsible for their actions, but the causes of the actions are situational. In the view of  [12] confirmed that an act of crime is stimulated by a particular situation. crime is a product of environmental factors that show the failure of state. That is, crime actions are end result of frustration, marginalisation, depression and subjugation of a weaker class by a stronger class in a state which emanates from individual psychological feeling, sociological makeup, and experience that individuals or groups are exposed to, choices resulting from the interaction, and the personal behavior of the person involved in the crime. The action are judge to be wrong but  the situation surrounding the action is not considered; when the situation are consider the action may be morally justified on the bases of state failures or weaker state institution mechanism.

The assumptions of the theory:

1. People are essentially rule-guided creatures. They express themselves and respond to friction or events within the context of guided choices.
2. Social order is based on the rule of conduct reflected in human behavior.
3. The causes of actions are situational-based.
4. People are responsible for their action
5. People are the source of their actions in line with the way they perceive the situation in the state, they choose, and execute their actions.
6. Crimes emanated from justifiable condition, even action is wrong to the rule guiding the state. Crime may be act of express moral action to show the condition for a failing state. Crimes are actions that break rules of conduct about what is the right and wrong thing to do in a particular circumstance [13].

The limitation of this theory is the romanticisation of crime action may be the political and selfish will of an individual or group rather than nationalistic which may not originated from state failure, yet the ambiguous action of the insurgents and bandits remains and persists to the detriment of the citizens. In another perspective, it is an action responding to the failure of the government but the effects are bear by the citizens, which sometimes result in the loss of lives and properties.

Relevance of the theory to this paper titledHuman Security a Tool for Counter-insurgency in South East Nigeria.  The situational action theory explains the prevailing situation that causes insurgency in the South East Nigeria States in particular, which are products of psychological experiences such as frustrations, feeling of political marginalisation, inequalities, and unemployment in the region. The sociological factors of the insurgency is the articulation of  the interesting of some group with the believe that the eastern part of Nigeria is political and economic marginalised. The situation has resulted to crimes activities that is challenging to human security in the eastern region of Nigeria because of the insurgence activities.  

 The Nigerian government asserted that the insurgents in the east are politically motivated by  political cabers and their actions prove that they are contributing to the state failure. The government strategy is not active  to combat these wide-spread insurgencies in the southeast.  The inadequate or poor implementation of the policies on security issues in the southeast region and Nigeria at large is a challenge to national security. Crimes are moral actions justified by perpetrators in the southeast due to the feeling of marginalisation and situation the youth found themselves in the region and the circumstances surrounding the operation of the insurgence activities. The situational action theory is the framework that explain the political scenario in this study in which human security is viewed as the best approach to counter-insurgency in the eastern part of Nigeria.

1.2 Methodology

This work derived its analysis from secondary sources of data. The historical and contextual analysis uses existing data. The study relied on content and descriptive methods of data analysis. The  secondary sources of data include journals, newspapers, Magazines, and books.

2.0 The Insurgency in  Nigeria

The origin of Nigeria’s insurgency can be traced to colonialism and the pre-independence epoch with feelings of distrust among enthnic differences, an Unharmonious bargaining structure toward independence and disunity among the regions in the country, and the inclination of ethnic parties before independence. The political crisis of the 1953 Kano riot, a reaction to disagreement between the northern and the southern  over the motion for independence in 1956 by Anthony Enaharo in 1953 show the disunity in the state [14]. The insurgency act was inform of political agitation or political crisis to achieve the goals or objectives of a particular group or sect. The inclination of political parties along ethnic line from colonialism to independence paved the way for insurgency activities that were identified in the first republic. Action Group (AG) Western political party, Northern Peoples Congress (NPC)  Northern political party, and National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) which was changed to the National Convention of Nigerian Citizens within 1944-1966 later became an Eastern political party after the death of Herbert Marculey the leader of the party; who was later succeeded by the secretary of the party Dr. Nnamadi Azikwe. The foundational causes of insurgency in Nigeria can be traceable to endogenous factors such as tribalism, nepotism, mediocracy, corruption, mismanagement, and marginalization of the minority groups in the country [8]. This was more of a challenge to the unity of the state as the diversities penetrated the political scene of the country.

The operations of the insurgency were viewed from different perspectives which explain the phenomenon around Nigeria’s endemic characters. Insurgency is a rebellion against a constituted authority of the state either in the pursuit of political interest or for selfish goals [15]. There is a nexus between insurgency and terrorist acts in terms of operation or mechanism of attaining their goals. The argument of  [16] captured in (17)  was against the support that insurgency and terrorism are the same. That is insurgency is not war, terrorism, or guerilla war. Even with the understanding that some insurgent groups used the terrorist act to achieve their goals. [18] affirmed the symmetry relationship between insurgency and terrorism since the two concepts involve some adaptation of the same mechanisms to achieve their goals such as guerrilla warfare, bombing, kidnapping, and abduction. The two phenomena were the activities carried out by individuals and groups of individuals against the constituted authority with violent actions, this affirmed the nexus between insurgence and terrorism [18]. Terrorism serves as a means to an end in achieving insurgency political interest or struggle. When insurgency acts cannot be managed or curtailed by the state it can generate to a civil war; this agrees with [19] analysis of insurgency cited in [17]. Insurgency is an organized rebellious group that uses force or weapons of deterrence to pursue a targeted goal against a constituted government [17]. Insurgency is a phenomenon that is born act of frustration, political interest,  marginalisation, and personal interest of group or individual in pursuing a goal against the constituted authority to arrest the attention of the state; which is a challenge to citizens’ livelihood and properties in a state.The analysis of insurgency activities within these scholarly views was suitable for Nigeria’s state.

The first insurgency in Nigeria’s history was the movement to liberate the Niger Delta people led by Major Isaac Jasper Adaka Boro; which produced a group known as the Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF) [8]. It was a militia organization that comprised Boro’s Ijaw brotherhood. The group attempted to gain independence on February 1966 known as the Niger Delta Republic, which was crushed by the power of federal military force, when the leader was arrested.  The civil war saga of 30 months from 6 July to 15 January 1970 tagged the Biafra war was a form of great insurgency in Nigeria [8].

In the fourth republic, several groups of insurgencies emerged [7]. The establishment of the Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) was led by Ralph Uwazurike, a lawyer and human rights activist. This group has been well known for its struggle and agitation for the independence of the Biafra State since its formation in 1999 [20]. This is a kind of flashback to achieving the goal of the unfulfilling Biafra War of 1967. Their activities are a reflection of the political insurgency of flexible character which opens the way for a radical group of Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) which was formed in 2014 by Nnamdi Kanu an Igbo political activist trained in Britain [21]. The emergency force of IPOB has caused a series of insurgency acts more than ever before, since 2021 to date in Nigeria’s history [22]. Other sectional groups from the south-south region such as the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force, Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), The Yoruba sectionalize group Oodua People’s Congress (OPC)  Founded in 1997 by  Fredrick Fasheun with its militant organ led by  Ganiyu Adams, Arewa Youth Congress (AYC), and different Islamic sects with different religious ideologies in the northern part engulfed by intra-religious and inter-religious crisis cannot be exempted from insurgency or infliction of political crisis in Nigeria [23];  [8]; [24]; [7].  These groups were sensitive to the interest of their people which sometimes reflected insurgency acts. The insurgency acts produced  some people who appear to some Nigerians as the insurgents’ personalities in the south-south region of Nigeria.

Nigeria State has been greeted with a series of terrorist and bandit attacks over the years. Armed banditry prevailed in Nigeria, and it has been competing with insurgency for the soul of Nigeria’s national security. The contemporary trajectories of armed banditry have been full of complications with the emergence of crime lords who engage in a self-aggrandizing but also socially sensitive criminal career [3]. The frustration and deprivation of many groups in the country led to insurgency activities such as inadequate infrastructural and social amenities, natural degradation of indigenous host communities in the south-south region, inadequate educational development for the youthful population in the Niger Delta region, and unemployment to the able youth in the region. The feeling of deprivation and subjugation in this region led to the insurgency against the state [25].  The activities of Boko Haram which  had been a challenge to the security of the state destroying lives and properties of northeast people of Nigeria most at its peak in 2014-2022. The banditry and insurgency alarming in the North West increase the state of insecurity in the country in particularly in Zamafra, Kaduna, and Katsina [26]. [27 .p14] asserted that violent conflicts between herders and farmers have become almost a daily phenomenon in Nigeria in recent times which is a new form of security concern to the government. The source of crises between the Fulani herders and the host southern communities is not the migration but the encroachment on private farmlands and the destruction of crops [17].

 The means to livelihood security are becoming more challenging as the rate of poverty and unemployment increases daily. Over the years, since 2014 the national security budgets have increased at the expense of other sectors, with a series of emergency spending from the Federal government, yet little or no positive impact has been felt on the means to the livelihood of the entire Nigerian State. The insurgency activities all over  Nigeria are a challenge to the human security and the economic development of the country.

2.1 Insurgency in South East Nigeria

The beginning of insurgency started in  eastern Nigeria in 1967 when the separatist movement  in Nigeria led by Lieutenant Colonel Chukwuemeka, Odumegwu-Ojukwu under the military regime declared the formation of the independent state of Biafra. This led to thirty months of civil war tagged “ no victory no vanquish”, which claimed lives and properties.  Since then, Nigeria continued to suffer from insurgency instability and revolts from regions. But Biafra fundamentalists were mostly dormant until the 2000s [28]; [29]. Some communities both in the southwest and Niger Delta such as Yoruba and Ijaw people were anti-Biafra and joined forces with the Federal government against the intending Biafra state [30]which frustrated the goal of Biafra movement. Ever since then, the feeling of marginalisation by some groups in the southeastern  paves the way for a series of insurgency activities against the state [30]. The feeling of frustration and subjugation of the southeast region led to the establishment of the Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), Biafra Zionist Movement (BZM) which rose to the prime in 2012, the Biafra Nations League (BNL) initially known as Biafra Nations Youth League ( BNYL), and the Biafran National Guard (BNG) [31]; [32]; [33]; [34]. The hit form of insurgency has risen in 2021 to date through the effort of IPOB.

A series of insurgency events were traced to the leader of IPOB, Nnamdi Kanu self-identifies as a Jew and claims that their origin was from Israel of which Judaism is the Igbo’s traditional religion [35]. Kanu was first arrested by the Nigerian security forces on 19 October 2015, on charges of ethnic incitement, division of the country, and treasonable felony. His arrest has pushed IPOB supporters into the militant organisation, as their mobilization has increased. There have been a series of protests and police clashes; on 2 December 2015, nine protesters and two policemen were killed at a protest in Onitsha, Anambra state [36]. Since 2015, there have been many insurgency activities of protesters who have been reportedly killed by policemen in the southeast region of Nigeria particularly Aba, Onitsha, Enugu, and Umahia [37]. The arrangement of Kanu was before the Nigeria High Court sometime in 2016 and his release over health challenges to take care of his health at this particular time, after which he claimed that the Nigerian Army raided his house to kill him, before his disappearance abroad. The tempo of these events enhanced IPOB’s strategies against the state government.

In August 2020, 21 IPOB members were executed by Nigerian police forces in Enugu with two police officers dead. The issue was more controversial as both sides laid allegations of the first shot at one other {38}.  the incident, gave IPOB the privilege to start practicing self-defense; in retaliation for the casualty incurred by the IPOB, two Nigerian soldiers were killed in late September at Enugu [39]. IPOB denied this allegation of involvement in this incident as they claimed they were an unarmed organisation. On 12 December 2020, Kanu announced the establishment of the Eastern Security Network (ESN) paramilitary organisation to protect southeast indigenous against Fulani herdsmen. The Nigerian government deployed the army to counter the objective by destorying ESN camps two weeks later [40]. The activities of the Nigerian police and army against IPOB paved the way for an insurgence in the southeast toward the tail end of 2020 which challenged the livelihood security of the indigenous people of the Igbo land and the settlers in this region. The insurgency at this focal period claimed the lives of the military, police, and civilians in the region during the crucial period, as the ESN focused on the Fulani raiders in the southeast.

The Orlu crisis from 22 to 28 January 2021   created insurgency in this area, and at this particular time five ESN members were killed, and there was retaliation from ESN  after some days four Nigerians military were killed [29]. This political unrest retarded economic growth and development as businesses were inactive in this community.  A day after the Orlu crisis in Imo state IPOB demanded that all the southeast governors ban open grazing after fourteen days [41]. However, the ESN did not wait for the ultimatum days; a few days later, ESN operatives bombed a Fulani camp in Isuikwuato, Abia State, killing their livestock and burning down their houses [29]. Following the attack, some governors in the southeast responded to ESN’s call and banned open grazing [41].  The tempo of the IPOB crisis was high through its paramilitary organisation in the eastern states between February and March 2021 in particularly Imo State and Anambra State, where the police station was attacked in Aboh Mbaise, Imo State policemen were killed in Aguata, Anambra State [42], [43]. The spillover effect was felt in part of the former East Region and the Niger  Delta region such as Cross River State and Delta State; when two policemen were killed in Cross River on 3 March 2021 [44], [45], [46]. The seriousness of this crisis led to the insurgency in the eastern part of the country. Some of the activities of ESN were condemned by MASSOB; But Hope Uzodinma, the Imo State ex-governor was blamed for inviting the Nigerian Army to the state which fueled the Orlu crisis and aftermath [47]. Most of the activities of ESN were against the Fulani herders and the effect of this paramilitary organisation was felt in Niger Delta and Benue the neighboring states to protect the Igbos and farmers in this area [48].

On 27 June 2021, Nnamdi Kanu was captured by Interpol in Kenya, extradited to Nigeria, and handed over to Nigerian authorities. Following the IPOB leader’s detention, his “self-acclaimed disciple” Simon Ekpa rose to prominence, claiming that Biafran activists would prevent the Anambra State gubernatorial election of November 2021 [49]. Within the month of June to December, there were a series of insurgency attacks in the eastern part of the country. However, sometimes some international organisations and Nigerian courts have declared the extraditing and  detention of Kanu as illegal. The United Nations Working Group and Human Rights July 2022 declared the detention of Kanu as arbitrary against his human rights and the United Nations ordered his release and payment for infringing rights [50]. Likewise, the court of appeals in Abuja on 20 October 2022 also declared the release of  Nnamdi Kanu. The reaction of the Nigerian government was a challenge to the rule of law of the state by not complying on the release of Kanu as the Nigerain court had pronounced.  

The extradite of Nnamadi Kanu in 2021 has caused the insurgency acts that led to the loss of lives and properties in the eastern region of  Nigeria through sit–at–home that started on 16 and 26 May 2022 which mark the day Biafra leader, Kanu will appear before the court; which harmed the economic education and the livelihood of the citizens in this region [51]. The sit-at-home syndrome claimed many lives of breadwinners of homes in the southeast. One of the prime tragic episodes was the murder of Dr. Chike Akunyili, the late Dora Akunyili’s husband, the former Director-General of the National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC) and also the former Information Minister in the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The education statutes for students and children declined in the East. Due to sit-at-home approach, the report states that transporters lose a huge sum of ten billion naira in the region particularly in Aba and Onisha market road (£18.5 million) for each sit-at-home day [51]. The sit-at-home on Monday had translated to a trading loss that amounts to something between seven hundred billion nairas (£1.3 billion) and three trillion nairas (£5.55 billion). Consumers and marketers who order goods and services from the east were also affected as their products were not delivered [51]. This made the productive capacities in the Southeast lose confidence in dealing with producers and major suppliers from other region of the country. The productive and economic capacities of the Onisha and Aba markets were declining economically and the livelihood of the people in the eastern region were challenging. The insurgency of continuing to sit down at home from 2022 to date is a challenge to human security in the southeast region.

The remote cause of the insurgency in the southeast region of Nigeria in the fourth republic was the feeling of marginalisation, suppression, and subjugation of the minority region in the political power sit of the country. This gained its roots from the defeated battle of Biafran independence of two and a half years between 1967-1970; a civil war that lost almost 3.5 million civilians to war and starvation [52], [53], [54].

However, the immediate cause of the insurgency in the southeast in the fourth republic was born from the belief that it was their turn to rule the country Nigeria. The frustration and the aggression were reflected in many groups that emanated from the foundation of the unactualised goal of Biafra in 1967 such as the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), Biafra Zionist Movement (BZM), the Biafra Nations League (BNL) initially known as Biafra Nations Youth League ( BNYL), and the Biafran National Guard (BNG), and Independence People of Biafra (IPOB). The contextual analysis shows the southeast region  were interested in the presidency which was reflected in the statement of the Ohanaeze group. The Ohanaeze declared that it was the turn of the southeast to produce the president [10]. George Obiozor, the president of Ohanaeze asserted the southeast is demanding the President not the Igbo head of state ([55]; [56]).  The political crisis and insurgency in the southeast are pleading for the political power of the presidency and if this is not attainable there is a need for independence, which is the statement of some political activists and leftist groups in the southeast. The eastern region is key interested in the executive power of the presidency than secession or independence. The advocacy for Biafra State is just a means to achieve their goal of political power in the Nigeria State.  However, failure to attain this goal will continue to lead to an unending demand for the Biafra State; which may lead to a political and deadly revolution if not well managed.

3.0 Human Security a Tool for Counter-Insugency in Southeast Nigeria in the Fourth Republic.

Democracy is in crisis worldwide at the very time when there is a need to renew emphasis on democratic practice as the key to the attainment of 21st-century human security aims. Our main task in today’s global community is to accept and live up to the triple challenge of development, security, and human rights. These three challenges are considered important on the United Nations agenda [57]. In the 21st century, democracy must be able to relate the values of human rights and participation to meeting the challenges of poverty, inequality, and the peaceful management of complex social relations. Human security is liberty from fear and liberty from want. The idea of human security moves its focus away from the State and makes the primary unit of analysis on the citizen, who is meant to live in freedom from fear and freedom from want. The concept has developed in response to the complex emergencies of the 1990s and 2000s [58] , [59]. The understanding of the seven dimensions of human security in any given state can prevent war and can serve as a tool for counter-insurgency in a state if properly addressed. The seven dimensions of human security which are political security, economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, and community security are important factors in preventing insurgency in a state. The theory of human security is an answer to the root cause of poverty, inequality, and marginalization ([59], [60], [61], of which can be solution to the problem of insurgency in the  Southeast Nigeria.

Political security will ensure human rights, the prevention of inequalities and bring full political participation of the people to the government decisions in a state. Economic security will guarantee employment and empowerment to prevent poverty and low standard of living; while food security will improve the agricultural development of the state, balanced diet and nutrition for a good healthy condition [62]. Health security prevents health challenges and a low life span which paves the way for a productive population that improves quality productive capacities. Environmental security prevents pollution and environmental hazards, land degradations, floods, and earthquakes; community security prevents Inter-ethnic, religious, and other identity-based violence while personal security prevents terrorism, crime, physical violence, domestic violence, and child labor [63]. Human security is a means to an end of livelihood security.

Human security is a prime tool to counter insurgency in the southeast of Nigeria. It is a humanistic center and pro-development of a state. It is a strategic approach to peace which is more profitable than state security which is more of a military approach. It is clear term that the military approach to insurgency acts in the southeast of Nigeria adds more aggression and provocative action of the IPOB group in the eastern states of Nigeria; as a case in Imo state when the governor of Imo state invited the military into Orlu crisis in the state [64]. The reaction of the military increases the tension in the state; this is because the action is not a humanistic approach. Human security is people people-centred open room for deliberation, negotiation, and compromise that can ensure lasting peace. This deliberation paves the way for freedom from fear that guarantee equal political participation, human rights, and liberation from political marginalization. The insurgency in the southeast is more of a demand and aspiration for political power than independence. It is more of the feeling of marginalization and deprivation which could be settled through a humanistic approach and dialogue; which can prevent feelings of domination. The release of Igbo political activist Nnamdi Kanu  for progressive dialogue among the six geo-political zones in the country; beyond politics of ethnicity and sentiment can end insurgency in Nigeria and the southeast; the prevailing jurgement of life imprisonment by Justice James Omotosho of the Federal High Court of Nigeria on November 20, 2025, after being found guilty of terrorism and other charges escalated another parallel scenario to Nigeria political lineage which may result to political demage for the country if not properly manage (65).  This study advocates for a situation where morality or an ideal situation can prevail over intended justice.

4.0 Conclusion

Human security theory that is human-centric and pro-development will end insurgency in the southeast. There should be a  political ideology among political parties in Nigeria that can produce political leaders basically on potential rather than ethnicity plurality. Political ideologies will help Nigeria’s political system. Human security that centres on individuals or citizens in a state will lead to a more productive state than a military strategic approach that is warfare in nature; a humanistic approach strategy that avoids subjugation and suppression may serve as counter-insurgency acts in  Nigeria. Humanistic tendencies and open dialogue will solve the problem of banditry and insurgency in Nigeria as tolerance through security studies will help the society politically, socially, economically, and in all ramifications to prevent marginalization and enhance unity in the state. This paper recommends political security that should create equality and political participation at the national level, in terms of a dividend of democracy to every part of Nigeria as one of the solutions to the insurgency in the South East and Nigeria in particular.

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